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Coin ﬂipping is a cryptographic primitive in which two distrustful parties wish to generate 
a random bit to choose between two alternatives. This task is impossible to realize when it 
relies solely on the asynchronous exchange of classical bits: one dishonest player has complete 
control over the ﬁnal outcome. It is only when coin ﬂipping is supplemented with quantum 
communication that this problem can be alleviated, although partial bias remains. Unfortunately, 
practical systems are subject to loss of quantum data, which allows a cheater to force a bias 
that is complete or arbitrarily close to complete in all previous protocols and implementations. 
Here we report on the ﬁrst experimental demonstration of a quantum coin-ﬂipping protocol 
for which loss cannot be exploited to cheat better. By eliminating the problem of loss, which 
is unavoidable in any realistic setting, quantum coin ﬂipping takes a signiﬁcant step towards 
real-world applications of quantum communication. 
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Coin flipping is the art of tossing a coin to allow two parties to choose between two alternatives in the least biased way. The importance of this primitive led Manuel Blum to introduce 
‘coin flipping by telephone’, in which the two spatially separated par-
ties do not necessarily trust each other but still wish to ensure that 
the outcome of the coin flip is unbiased1. Throughout this article, we 
only consider asynchronous protocols, which consist of a sequence 
of rounds in which Alice and Bob alternate in sending classical or 
quantum messages to each other. For any such classical coin-flip-
ping protocol, one of the parties can, given sufficient computational 
power, deterministically choose the outcome, in which case we say 
the protocol is broken.
In the quantum world, this is no longer true2–6. Although no 
unbiased protocol can exist7,8, the probability for a cheater to fix 
an arbitrary desired outcome can be asymptotically reduced9 to 
1/ 2?70.7% (the possibility that a cheater may be interested in 
obtaining either outcome defines strong coin flipping; the only type 
of protocols considered here). This bound is due to Kitaev9, whose 
proof is reproduced in ref. 10. Note that quantum coin flipping dif-
fers from quantum key distribution11,12 in the fact that Alice and 
Bob are potential adversaries, not collaborators. The importance of 
quantum coin flipping lies not only in its potential for applications, 
but also, more fundamentally, in the fact that quantum communi-
cation allows one to implement a cryptographic primitive that is 
impossible using solely classical communication.
The typical structure of most previous protocols is as follows. 
Alice sends a quantum state |?? to Bob, chosen from an agreed-
upon set, that conceals a bit a. Bob returns a classical bit b. Alice 
then discloses which |?? was sent, thereby revealing a. Bob can now 
perform a measurement on the received state, the result of which 
should confirm that Alice did indeed send state |??. If Bob’s result is 
inconsistent with the description |??, he declares a mismatch. Oth-
erwise, the outcome c of the coin flip is the exclusive OR of a and 
b, denoted c = a?b. Importantly, Alice must not be able to declare 
a value of a that depends on the value of b without risking being 
caught cheating through Bob’s measurement of |??. Furthermore, 
Bob must not be able to determine the value of a from a measure-
ment of |?? before returning his bit.
As usual in quantum communication, quantum states are 
encoded into photons, which are susceptible to loss in the trans-
mission channel and measurement apparatus. For quantum coin 
flipping, the mere possibility that Bob may not detect Alice’s quan-
tum state can be highly problematic13,14. For example, if the proto-
col specifies that Bob’s measurement happens after Alice revealed 
her bit, this allows him to cheat by pretending that the quantum 
state was lost whenever he is not happy with a?b. Consequently, 
if Alice allows the protocol to be restarted until Bob declares a 
detection, the latter can completely control the outcome. Unfor-
tunately, this practical problem has been overlooked in almost all 
previous protocols2–6. Therefore, any implementation based on 
such protocols is completely broken under realistic experimental 
conditions.
Before this work, two quantum coin-flipping protocols have been 
implemented. The first implementation15 is based on a protocol that 
is completely broken in the presence of loss14. The second avoids 
this pitfall by using a protocol that does not require Bob to detect 
a photon to produce an outcome16. This, however, gives rise to a 
new attack in which a malicious Alice tampers with the loss of the 
transmission line, such that her probability to choose the outcome is 
arbitrarily close to 100%, which makes this protocol effectively bro-
ken. In the reported implementation of this protocol, Alice could 
choose the outcome with a probability of 99.71% for 16 dB loss. 
This probability would further increase for higher loss. Therefore, 
both aforementioned protocols, and their implementations, could 
hardly (if at all) be used in any practical application based on coin 
flipping.
To be of practical use, a protocol should be designed to tolerate 
loss in the transmission channel. Here we present the first experi-
mental demonstration of a quantum coin-flipping protocol for 
which loss cannot be exploited to cheat better. More precisely, our 
implementation allows us to bound the successful cheating prob-
ability to a value that is independent of loss.
Results
A loss-tolerant quantum coin-flipping protocol. We begin with 
describing our protocol. We refer to our original proposal for a 
thorough description14. Let us first assume that both parties are 
honest. Alice sends a qubit whose state |?x,a? is chosen randomly 
among the following, previously agreed-upon set (Fig. 1): 
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where |? + ? = cos ?|0? + sin ?|1?, |? − ? = sin ?|0? − cos ?|1? and 
0° < ?? 45°. Here we call x and a Alice’s basis and bit, respectively. 
Bob then attempts to measure Alice’s qubit in a basis y?{0,1} from 
the set described above, chosen at random. If Bob does not detect 
the qubit, he asks Alice to send another randomly selected state. 
This is repeated until Bob detects the qubit, in which case he sends 
a random bit b to Alice. When Alice receives b, she reveals x and 
a to Bob. If y = x, Bob’s measurement outcome should agree with 
Alice’s declared state |?x,a?, in which case a is accepted. In case of a 
disagreement, Bob declares a mismatch. If y?x, Bob has no way to 
verify Alice’s claim and he must accept her bit on faith. The outcome 
of the protocol is c = a?b. Note that we do not consider denial-of-
service attacks, as in the case where Bob postpones the outcome of 
a coin flip indefinitely.
The loss tolerance of our protocol stems from two features. The 
first is that Bob’s declaration of a successful measurement happens 
before Alice reveals her bit a. The second is that Bob gains no advan-
tage in falsely declaring that Alice’s qubit was lost. In particular, it is 
physically impossible for Bob to conclusively determine Alice’s bit 
a with certainty, given a single copy of |?x,a?. The performance of 
optimal cheating strategies depends on the value of ?. For the states 
given in equation (1) with ? = 45°, which we refer to as the BB84 
states (Fig. 1a), Alice’s maximum probability to fix the outcome, PA, 
is (6 + 2)/8?92.7%; she is caught cheating with the complemen-
tary probability, that is, when a mismatch occurs. Bob’s equivalent 
(1)
A0
A0
B1
B1A1 A1
B0 B0
??= 45° ??? 36.9°
?1,0 ?1,0
?0,0 ?0,0?0,1
?1,1 ?1,1
?0,1
Figure 1 | Honest and cheating states of the loss-tolerant protocol. The 
states used are represented on a great circle on the Bloch sphere.  
(a) BB84 states, corresponding cheating states |A0? and |A1? for Alice, equal 
to |?A
? ? and |?A
? ? with ?A = 67.5°, and corresponding cheating states |B0? 
and |B1? for Bob, equal to |?B
? ? and |?B
? ? with ?B = 22.5°. (b) Fair states and 
the corresponding cheating states deﬁned as for the BB84 states but with 
?A?63.4° and ?B?18.4°.
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probability, PB, is (2 + 2)/4?85.4%, which makes the use of these 
symmetrically distributed states unfair as Alice can cheat better. By 
setting ? = arccos(4/5)?36.9°, which results in what we call the fair 
states (Fig. 1b), this asymmetry is removed, leading to PA = PB = 90%. 
For both sets of states, Alice’s optimal cheating strategy consists of 
randomly sending one of the two orthogonal states |A0? and |A1? that 
are positioned symmetrically between states representing different 
bit values a, as shown in Figure 1. This choice allows her to always 
declare an x and a that will produce the outcome of her choice while 
minimizing her probability of being caught cheating. Bob’s optimal 
cheating strategy consists of measuring the received qubit in basis 
{|B0?,|B1?}, where |Bi? is positioned symmetrically between the states 
that correspond to the bit value a = i, as shown in Figure 1. This 
maximizes his probability to guess the value of Alice’s bit. We do not 
consider the case in which both Alice and Bob are cheating, as the 
goal of the protocol is to protect honest players only.
So far, we considered the noiseless scenario in which declaration 
of a mismatch occurs only if a player is trying to cheat. In general, 
however, the presence of intrinsic noise entails a probability of get-
ting a mismatch as the outcome, even if both players are honest. 
Nevertheless, the cautious honest player should assume the declara-
tion of a mismatch to be due to cheating, and not allow restarting 
the protocol in this case. Hence, the ideal scenario can be approxi-
mated only if the intrinsic noise level is small. We stress, however, 
that the presence of noise has no effect on the key property of our 
protocol and implementation, namely that PA and PB are upper 
bounded independently of loss. This makes quantum coin flipping 
possible in the presence of loss.
Experimental set-up. For the experimental implementation of the 
protocol, the restrictions on Alice’s qubit source are very stringent, 
even more than in quantum key distribution, as Bob is an adversary 
who is potentially cheating. With current technology, one practi-
cal choice is to use a suitably designed source of pairs of entangled 
qubits such that projecting one qubit at Alice’s remotely prepares the 
qubit sent to Bob in a state chosen at random among the states of 
equation (1). We already presented a security proof in the case where 
Alice sends qubits encoded into true single photons and where the 
experiment is noiseless14. A complete security proof for an imple-
mentation based on a source of entangled photons should, however, 
take into account all possible sources of imperfections and possibly 
requires adapting squashing models developed for some quantum 
key distribution protocols17,18 (see Methods). We note that because 
of the adversarial nature of Alice and Bob, and the particular choice 
of projection measurements, these studies do not straightforwardly 
apply to our coin-flipping protocol.
Our experimental set-up is detailed in Figure 2. Time-bin 
entangled photonic qubits19 in the state 
| (| | | | )?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?1
2
e eA B A B? ?
are created, where |e?A(B) and |??A(B) represent the early and late 
time-bin states of Alice (Bob) and are associated with the generic 
states |0? and |1? used above to describe the protocol. One qubit 
remains in Alice’s laboratory where it is randomly projected on one 
of the four states defined in equation (1) using a universal time-bin 
qubit analyser20 (UTBA); see Methods for details. This has the effect 
of remotely preparing the other qubit in the same state. The latter 
is sent to Bob over the quantum channel consisting of 10 m polari-
zation-maintaining fibre (this short link was later replaced by a 
12.4 km underground fibre link; see below). The total photon loss of 
the 10 m link, which includes the coupling of Bob’s photon into the 
optical fibre, all optical losses and the inefficiency of Bob’s detectors, 
was equal to 23.2 ? 2.0 dB. Bob, by virtue of his UTBA, then meas-
ures his time-bin qubit in a randomly chosen basis y. The UTBAs 
enable projective measurements of time-bin qubits in arbitrary 
bases, which facilitates the implementation of the fair protocol and 
of all the cheating strategies. Each coincidence detection between 
Alice and Bob defines a coin-flip instance for which all steps of the 
protocol are performed as described above. Therefore, each instance 
is a complete demonstration of our protocol.
Performance of loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping. We per-
formed coin flipping both with the BB84 and the fair states, in each 
case with honest players or one cheater, as determined by the settings 
of the UTBAs. For each configuration, we performed at least 80,000 
instances over the 10 m link. Let us consider the honest cases first. We 
estimated the intrinsic error probability P*, that is the probability for 
Bob to declare a mismatch when nobody is cheating, and the prob-
abilities P0 and P1 of outcomes c = 0 and 1 per coin-flip instance. As 
shown on Figure 3a, the P* obtained when using either the BB84 or 
the fair states is less than 2%, and the outcome probabilities P0 and P1 
are equal within one standard deviation. The non-zero P * is caused 
by intrinsic noise stemming from experimental imperfections.
50/50
PPLN
DM
Laser
Pump interferometer
Free-space UTBA Fibre UTBA TDC
Pump filterPBS
HWP
Retroreflector
Fibre
Link
Fibre coupler
Polarization controller
Start
Stop
Stop
Stop
Stop
Bob
Alice
Mixer
clk
S2
S1
Mixer
Ready
I1
I2
S2
S1 S2
clk
I1
I2
Trigger
Figure 2 | Experimental set-up. A laser diode sends 50 ps pulses at 530.6 nm wavelength through an interferometer with path-length difference 
equivalent to 1.4-ns travel-time difference. The pulses emerge in an even superposition of two well-deﬁned time bins that we label the early and late bins 
and then propagate into a nonlinear, periodically poled lithium niobate crystal (PPLN), thereby creating time-bin entangled qubits at 807 and 1,546 nm  
wavelengths through spontaneous parametric downconversion. The two qubits are separated at the dichroic mirror (DM). The free-space and ﬁbre 
UTBAs allow Alice and Bob to measure their qubits in randomly selected bases x and y, respectively, as deﬁned by equation (1); see Methods. The angle 
? is selected by the orientation of the output half-wave plate (HWP) at Alice’s and the polarization controller at Bob’s. The coincidence detections are 
monitored using a TDC and analysed in real-time to realize all steps of the protocol. Clk; laser clock; PBS, polarization beam splitter.
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Next, we consider the cases in which either Alice or Bob tries 
to fix the outcome c of every coin flip. The cheater’s UTBA was 
aligned for optimal cheating. For each instance, the cheater chooses 
a desired value for c, uniformly distributed. We experimentally esti-
mated the probability PA (PB) for Alice (Bob) to fix the outcome to 
the desired bit value, as well as PA* (PB*), the probability of a mis-
match in the presence of cheating. We assumed that a cheating Bob 
would always declare a mismatch when he was unhappy with the 
outcome. Therefore, PA + PA* = PB + PB* = 1. As a first observation of 
the results presented in Figure 3b, we note that the values obtained 
for PA and PB with the BB84 states are clearly unfair as PA > PB, in full 
accordance with the theory. In Figure 3c, we see that this asymmetry 
is removed when using the fair states. Furthermore, when using the 
BB84 states, PA = 91.1 ? 0.1%, which is higher than 90% by 11 stand-
ard deviations, that is, we are able to show that Alice can signifi-
cantly cheat better than what is theoretically possible with the fair 
states. Similarly, when using the fair states, PB = 88.4 ? 0.1% > 85.4% 
by 30 standard deviations, which demonstrates that Bob can signifi-
cantly cheat better than what is theoretically possible with the BB84 
states. Finally, we note that the probability for a mismatch to occur 
increases from P* < 2% to PA*, PB* ? ???% in the presence of optimal 
cheating.
To test our set-up in a real-world setting, we replaced the 10-m 
link with a 12.4 km long underground standard telecommunication 
fibre link connecting two laboratories positioned at the University 
of Calgary (UofC) and at the Southern Alberta Institute of Tech-
nology (SAIT), respectively. In particular, this allowed us to study 
the effect of loss on the performance of our implementation. The 
two locations are physically separated by 3.3 km and the total pho-
ton loss was equal to 32.8 ? 2.0 dB. The modifications to the set-up 
required to realize the experiment over the underground fibre link 
are detailed elsewhere20. Globally, the effect of the added loss is to 
decrease the signal-to-noise ratio and, consequently, to increase the 
error probabilities P*, PA* and PB* and lower all other probabilities 
(Fig. 3d–f). We stress that this is due to the presence of experimental 
imperfections, such as detector dark counts, and not because of the 
protocol itself. Moreover, as discussed below, this could be mitigated 
with state-of-the-art single-photon detector technology.
Quantum coin flipping in the presence of noise. To gain further 
insight into how noise affects an implementation of our protocol when 
based on a source of entangled photons, we modelled the detection 
statistics of such an implementation taking into account loss, detec-
tor dark counts, multi-pair emission and imperfect optical align-
ment (Supplementary Notes 1–3). Using our estimated experimental 
parameters, we produced a theoretical curve of the intrinsic error 
probability P* as a function of the total loss applied to Bob’s photon, 
and compared it against the measured values with the fair states; Fig-
ure 4a. The model compares well with the measurements. The model 
predicts that P* should equal 10% in the vicinity of 40 dB loss. With 
this model, we can also directly show that the increase of P* originates 
mostly from dark counts at Bob’s detectors. This becomes clear when 
considering Figure 4b showing the theoretical curve of P* (solid line) 
generated assuming a dark count rate of 10 Hz for Bob’s detectors, as 
well as slightly improved experimental conditions. Note that noise-
free single-photon detectors at 1,550 nm have been reported21, mak-
ing our assumption realistic. Under these conditions, and for loss up 
to 50 dB, P* is essentially constant. Moreover, the low value of P* one 
would obtain (~0.37%) highlights that the transmission and meas-
urement of photonic qubits is much more likely to be affected by loss 
than by noise. This shows the need for a protocol to tolerate loss.
The presence of noise has another consequence on implemen-
tations of coin-flipping protocols. For given values of P0, P1, P*, 
PA ? ??? and PB ? ???, it was recently reported22 (see also ref. 16) that 
e One cheater - BB84 - 12.4 km link f  One cheater - fair - 12.4 km link
b One cheater - BB84 - 10 m linka Honest players - 10 m link
d Honest players - 12.4 km link
c
 One cheater - fair - 10 m link
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Figure 3 | Results. The column plots show the honest-player cases (a, d), one-cheater cases with BB84 states (b, e) and the one-cheater cases with fair 
states (c, f). All data collection runs consisted of at least 80,000 (or 7,000) coin-ﬂip instances with the 10 m link (or the 12.4 km link); the one-standard-
deviation uncertainties on P0, P1, PA and PB are at most 0.15% (or 0.5%); the uncertainty on P* is at most 0.04% (or 0.1%); the uncertainties on PA* and PB* 
are at most 0.13% (or 0.5%). All uncertainties are statistical assuming a Poisson distribution.
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there exist classical protocols yielding this set of probabilities if and 
only if P0, P1?PAPB and
P* ? PC* = 2(1−PA) (1−PB)
This defines a benchmark for comparison between a noisy imple-
mentation of a quantum protocol and what is classically possible, as 
proposed in ref. 16. Specifically, assuming P0, P1?PAPB holds, one can 
define a figure of merit M = PC* − P* that is zero or negative if, and only 
if, there exists a classical protocol capable of reproducing the results. 
The first implementation yielding a positive M was reported in ref. 16, 
but it remains of limited interest because it is effectively broken in the 
presence of loss. As shown in Table 1, our results over the 10 m link 
yield a positive M and, therefore, cannot be reproduced classically. 
For the 12.4 km link, M lies around zero with the fair states (consider-
ing uncertainty), meaning that our implementation performs neither 
better nor worse than what is classically possible. This is consistent 
with the predictions of our model of the detection statistics (Fig. 4a). 
With the BB84 states, however, we obtain M < 0, which means that our 
results could be reproduced classically. For completeness, we point 
(3)
out that the PC* one could expect using ultra-low-noise detectors at 
Bob’s is well above P* (dashed line on Fig. 4b).
Discussion
The work presented here shows how the problem of loss, the promi-
nent issue plaguing previous protocols and implementations, can be 
alleviated using a suitably designed protocol. During the prepara-
tion of this work, other groups have shown that our protocol can be 
modified to reduce the bias slightly23,24. Alternatively, a device-inde-
pendent and loss-tolerant protocol, having a bias lower than our 
protocol, was recently proposed25. Whether a loss-tolerant protocol 
can asymptotically reach the optimal bound for strong coin flipping9 
is still an open question.
Experimental noise can never be completely eliminated, and one 
must always compare the performance of a noisy implementation 
of a loss-tolerant protocol to classical protocols, as we have done 
here. It is not known if a noise-tolerant protocol, that is a protocol 
such that P* = 0 despite experimental imperfections14, can exist. In 
the negative, one could envision other (classically impossible) tasks 
that are based on repeated executions of our protocol. As suggested 
previously13,26, those tasks might benefit from the cheat sensitivity 
of our protocol.
Our work also raises the question of whether sophisticated 
approaches developed to prove the security of practical implementa-
tions of quantum key distribution, such as a squashing model, can 
be adapted to scenarios where both parties are distrustful of each 
other. This largely unexplored theme is of central importance for the 
security of two-party cryptographic protocols based on imperfect 
devices.
Methods
Source of entanglement. The pump laser was operated at a repetition rate of 
10 MHz (Fig. 2). The 10-mm long periodically poled lithium niobate crystal,  
with a 7.05-?m grating period, was heated to 176 °C. The mean number of photon 
pairs created per pump pulse was about 0.05, which sets the probabilities to create 
one and two pairs to 4.8% and 0.12%, respectively27. The created state is very close 
to being maximally entangled20. The observed noise comes mostly from dark 
counts in Bob’s InGaAs detectors and from imperfect optical alignment of the  
bulk interferometers.
Detection events were acquired by a time-to-digital converter (TDC), which 
measures delays between a start signal and several stop signals. The detection 
signals from Alice’s free-running Si-based single-photon detectors were preproc-
essed with an electronic mixer (Fig. 2). The trigger signal was generated when a 
detection at either S1 or S2 occurred. It emerged synchronously with the laser clock 
(clk). The signal was used to gate Bob’s InGaAs-based single-photon detectors 
during a 7-ns activation window. The signal ready, which was emitted only when 
both detectors were ready to detect, was used to start the TDC. This ensures that 
the statistics were not biased by the dead-time of Bob’s detectors. The detections at 
I1 and I2, as well as the signal S2?clk and S1?S2 served as stop signals, where ? 
denotes the logical AND and ? the logical OR. This allowed us to register all pos-
sible coincidence detection events, where the detection slots, early, middle and late, 
were narrowed down to widths varying from 400 to 800 ps. This particular event 
selection to retrieve information about detections at S1 and S2 was chosen because 
of hardware considerations in Alice’s mixer.
Table 1 | Figure of merit.
States Link Loss (dB) M ? ?M
BB84 10 m 23.2 ? 2.0 0.0116 ? 0.0005
Fair 10 m 23.2 ? 2.0 0.0082 ? 0.0005
BB84 12.4 km 32.8 ? 2.0  − 0.006 ? 0.002
Fair 12.4 km 32.8 ? 2.0  − 0.003 ? 0.002
The ﬁgure of merit M = PC* − P* for all cases. The 10-m link cases yield M > 0 and cannot be re-
produced with classical communication only. The results over the 12.4-km link yield M?0 (with 
the fair states, considering uncertainty), and M < 0 (with the BB84 states). Hence, with the fair 
states, our implementation performs neither better nor worse than what is classically possible. 
Our results with the BB84 states could, however, be reproduced classically. The uncertainty 
?M is statistical and assumes a Poisson distribution of detection events.
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Figure 4 | Performance with varying loss with the fair states. (a) The 
experimentally measured values of the intrinsic error probability P* (solid 
circles) and the theoretically calculated values, using the estimated 
experimental parameters (shaded area, delimited by solid lines) as a 
function of the total loss of Bob’s photon. The parameters are the mean 
number of photon pairs generated ?, the transmission of Alice’s channel 
?A, the probability of a dark count per 400-ps detection window for Alice’s 
(Bob’s) detectors dA (dB), and the ﬁdelity F of the generated entangled state 
with respect to state |? + ?. We used ? = 0.032 ? 0.004, ?A = 7.56 ? 2.23%, 
dA = 4×10
 − 8, dB = 2.5×10
 − 5, F = 97.8 ? 0.3% (Supplementary Table S1). Also 
shown are the values of PC* (hollow circles) corresponding to our measured 
values of PA and PB, as well as the theoretically calculated values (shaded 
area delimited by dashed lines). (b) Theoretically calculated values of P*  
(solid line) and PC* (dashed line) as a function of the total loss of Bob’s 
photon assuming ultra-low-noise detectors for Bob, that is, dB = 10 Hz×
400 ps = 4×10 − 9, and slightly improved experimental conditions, that is, 
? = 0.005, ?A = 9.8%, dA = 4×10 − 8, F = 99.25%.
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Requirements on Alice’s source of qubits. The adversarial nature of the play-
ers forces Alice to consider side channels that a cheating Bob could exploit. For 
instance, when using attenuated laser pulses or a heralded single-photon source28, 
Alice will sometimes send multiple photons. In this case, all photons would be 
prepared in the same qubit state |?x,a?. In the presence of loss, this allows a cheating 
Bob to declare that the photon was lost unless he detects two photons in different 
bases using his honest measuring apparatus. When this happens, Bob can  
conclusively determine Alice’s bit 64% of the time (with the fair states), in which 
case only will he declare the photon detected, thereby completely breaking the  
protocol14 (however, see ref. 29 for an alternative approach based on our protocol 
that avoids this problem, but at the expense of losing loss tolerance). The ideal 
solution would be for Alice to use a perfect source of single photons, but this is not 
practical with current technology. A more realistic choice is to use a source of  
maximally entangled pairs of photonic qubits that are separated and directed to 
Alice and Bob, respectively. A projection measurement at Alice’s then remotely 
prepares a state on Bob’s photon30. To thwart potential attacks in which a malicious 
player exploits the fact that the (necessarily imperfect) source sometimes emits 
more than one photon pair, the honest players proceed as follows: first, Alice’s 
source of entangled photons must be operated in the regime where the pump pulse 
duration (Tp) is much longer than the coherence time (?c) of the emitted photons. 
This condition, satisfied in our experiment (here, Tp/?c?185), ensures that all pho-
ton pairs generated by the same pump pulse are, with almost certainty, completely 
independent of each other. Second, Alice’s basis choice must be passive so that each 
of Alice’s photons is measured in an independently and randomly chosen basis. 
Third, both Alice and Bob (when honest) follow a procedure that is inspired by 
the squashing operation developed for projective measurements onto the BB84 
states17,18. More precisely, in the eventuality of multiple simultaneous clicks, honest 
players privately choose, randomly and uniformly, one of the outcomes for comple-
tion of the protocol. The goal of this procedure is to render our overall set-up 
equivalent to the one in which only single pairs are created, and where the  
previously mentioned cheating attack does not exist31. While plausible, the possibil-
ity of generalizing the squashing model to our specific scenario, and, more gener-
ally, to scenarios involving two distrustful parties, is still an open question and its 
resolution is beyond the scope of this work.
Universal time-bin qubit analysers. The free-space UTBA shown in Figure 2 can 
be understood as follows20: the polarization of the incident time-bin qubit is first 
rotated to 45° with respect to the linear polarization transmitted by the input polar-
izing beamsplitter. After passing through an interferometer with large path-length 
difference, the qubit emerges in three chronologically ordered time slots separated 
by 1.4 ns that we label early, middle and late. In the middle slot, the initial time-bin 
qubit is mapped on a polarization qubit, which can be analysed in any basis using 
standard waveplates, a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS) and detectors. This imple-
ments the detection in the x = 1 basis at Alice’s, where the angle ? is determined by 
the orientation of the half-wave plate located at the output of the interferometer. 
This angle was calibrated independently and had an uncertainty of at most,  
1°. A detection in the early (late) slots corresponds to a projection on |e?A (|??A), 
and this implements a measurement in the x = 0 basis. Therefore, the detection  
time at the single photon detectors S1 and S2 passively determines Alice’s basis.  
This is similar to previous projection measurement schemes for time-bin qubits32, 
yet, without the restriction to mutually unbiased bases.
Bob’s fibre UTBA is the fibre-optics equivalent of Alice’s free-space version. The 
input fibre, as well as the two arms of the interferometer, are made of polarization-
maintaining fibre. The output of the interferometer is a standard fibre and the angle 
? is selected by a polarization controller that was calibrated independently and had 
an uncertainty less than 2 degrees. Here again, the detection time at the single- 
photon detectors I1 and I2 determines Bob’s basis.
As both UTBAs are based on interferometers, they perform measurements 
in a given basis up to an azimuthal angle on the Bloch sphere. To implement the 
measurements needed to in the protocol, only the relative azimuthal angle between 
the bases of Alice and Bob’s UTBAs matter. Hence, each data collection run started 
by an adjustment of the azimuthal angle of Bob’s UTBA relative to Alice’s, the latter 
being passively stabilized during data collection. Bob’s angle was controlled using 
a circular piezo around which the fibre of the long arm was wound and glued. In 
this way, the angle could be selected with voltage. The relative angle was set to zero 
by maximizing the number of coincidences between I1 and S1. This procedure also 
minimizes P* and maximizes PA and PB.
The uncertainty on the values of ? of Alice’s and Bob’s UTBAs, as well as the 
relative azimuthal angle of their measurement bases, could have affected the per-
formance of our implementation. However, because of the meticulous calibration 
of our UTBAs, the effect of systematic errors on the performance of our implemen-
tation is assumed to be negligible and was not included in the analysis. We note 
that, in principle, this assumption could be relaxed by using a device-independent 
quantum coin flipping protocol such as the one proposed recently in ref. 25. 
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